Abstract. At EuroCrypt '08, Gilbert, Robshaw and Seurin proposed HB # to improve on HB + in terms of transmission cost and security against man-in-the-middle attacks. Although the security of HB # is formally proven against a certain class of man-in-the-middle adversaries, it is only conjectured for the general case. In this paper, we present a general man-in-the-middle attack against HB # and Random-HB # , which can also be applied to all anterior HB-like protocols, that recovers the shared secret in 2 25 or 2 20 authentication rounds for HB # and 2 34 or 2
Introduction
Designing secure cryptographic protocols using lightweight components is one of the main challenges of cryptography. Indeed, the emergence of new technology such as radio-frequency identification (RFIDs) with low computation and memory capabilities has stressed the need of such protocols.
These devices require protection from many threats. For example, for a company using RFIDs in inventories and supply-chain management, a RFID tag should be protected from cloning. Biometric passports also have a tight relation with RFIDs since they use contactless chips to communicate and authenticate the passport holder to some authorized authority. Using RFID tags as a replacement of barcodes by many merchant have also raised the issue of traceability and privacy protection. Thus, the need of authentication protocols providing efficiency, security and privacy protection has become a key factor for the future development of this technology. One of the most popular attempts to fulfill this need are the HB family of authentication protocol. At EuroCrypt '08, Gilbert, Robshaw and Seurin [8, 9] , proposed a new variant of HB + named Random-HB # and its optimized version HB # . In these protocols, the tag and the reader share some secret matrices X and Y . During an authentication instance, both issue challenges of k y -bit and k x -bit length respectively and the final response of the tag is a m-bit message disturbed by a noise vector in which every bit has a probability η of being 1.
The details of the Random-HB # and HB # protocols are outlined in Figure  1 and the proposed parameters (inspired from the results of [14] ) in Table 1 . The difference between these two versions lies in the structure of the secret matrices X and Y : while in Random-HB # these two are completely random, thus needing (k x + k y )m bits of storage, HB # reduces this amount to k x + k y + 2m − 2 by using Toeplitz matrices for X and Y .
Besides generating two random vectors ν and b, the operations performed by the tag to authenticate itself are very cheap: it only needs two matrix multiplications to compute aX and bY which can be implemented using basic AND and XOR operations along with two bitwise XOR operations between two m-bit vectors. In some variant, the tag generates a random error vector ν until it has weight no larger than t requiring the tag to be able to compute a Hamming weight wt.
Random-HB # is also accompanied with a proof of security in the GRS security model if the parameters satisfy the condition mη ≤ t ≤ m/2. Under the conjecture that the Toeplitz-MHB puzzle is hard, HB # is also secure in the same model. However, both protocols only provide "strong arguments" in favor of their resistance against man-in-the middle adversaries and formally proving their security in such a model was left as an open problem. Table 1 . HB # Parameter sets proposed in [8, 9] . P FR and P FA denote the false rejection and false acceptance rates respectively. In the set III, the Hamming weight of the error vector ν generated by the tag is smaller than t. Our Contribution. In this paper, we present an attack against Random-HB # and HB # in a general man-in-the-middle attack where the adversary is given the ability to modify all messages. The idea of our attack is to modify the messages of a session according to values obtained from a passive attack where the adversary eavesdrops on a protocol session between a reader and the tag.
Through this paper, we will denote b and z (resp. a) the values sent by the tag (resp. the reader) andb andẑ (resp.â) the value received by the reader (resp. the tag) after corruption by the adversary. Thus the tag computes z =âX ⊕ bY ⊕ ν while the reader checks that wt(aX ⊕bY ⊕ẑ) ≤ t.
Outline. Our paper is organized as follows. First, we show how it is possible to mount a man-in-the-middle attack against HB # by proposing an algorithm able to compute the Hamming weight of the errors introduced by the tag in a session (ā,b,z). Then, we provide a complexity analysis of this initial attack needed by the man-in-the-middle to fully recover the secret matrices of Random-HB # and HB # . Afterwards, we present our optimized attack in Section 4 and give the complexity results applied to parameter sets I and II of HB # of Table 1 . After that, we investigate some open proposals to limit the Hamming weight of the error vector in HB-like protocols and present an attack against the parameter set III of HB # shown in Table 1 . At last, we show the lower bounds on the parameters for which our attack does not work.
Basic Attack
In this section, we show that, contrarily to what was conjectured in [8, 9] , both Random-HB # and HB # are vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attacks by presenting a (non-optimized) attack.
Principle
The core of our attack is Algorithm 1 in which Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. It shows how an adversary able to modify messages going in both directions can compute the Hamming weight of the error vectorν =āX ⊕bY ⊕z denotedw = wt(ν) introduced in a triplet (ā,b,z). The crucial observation is that since z =âX ⊕bY ⊕ν, at in each for-loop of Algorithm 1, the reader computes the Hamming weight wt(ν ⊕ν) of
and accepts iff wt(ν ⊕ν) ≤ t.
Algorithm 1 Approximatingw
Input:ā,b,z, n Output:
an approximation ofw = wt(āX ⊕bY ⊕z) where
if reader accepts then 5:
c ← c + 1 6: end if 7: end for Correctness. We show, that the output of Algorithm 1 is indeed an estimation of wt(ν ⊕ν). The probability p that a bit of (ν ⊕ν) is 1 is given by:
Hence, m−w bits of (ν ⊕ν) follow a Bernoulli distribution of parameter η and the otherw bits follow a Bernoulli distribution of parameter 1 − η, thus wt(ν ⊕ν) follows a binomial distribution. Because of the independence of all bits, the expected value and variance of wt(ν ⊕ν) are given by µ = (m −w)η +w(1 − η) and σ 2 = mη(1 − η) respectively. We now define the function P as P (w) = Pr[wt(ν ⊕ν) ≤ t]. By the definition of the standard normal cumulative distribution function Φ and the central limit theorem, we have that
The random variable c n thus follows a normal distribution with expected value P (w) and variance 1 n P (w)(1 − P (w)). To decide whether wt(ν) =w or not, the estimate c n for P (wt(ν)) has to be good enough. The difference of the probabilities is at least P (w + 1) − P (w) ≈ P (w) which we can compute as
2 .
By taking
the probability that | Choice of Input. To determine a reasonable choice for the input n, we have to fix values for r and θ. If we can assume thatw = wt(ν) is an integer close to some value w 0 , we can call Algorithm 1 and r = 1 2 to inferw = P −1 ( c n ) with error probability erfc(θ) (here, · refers to normal rounding). On the other hand, if we know thatw ∈ {w 0 − 1, w 0 + 1}, we can choose r = 1 to inferw by the closest value to P −1 ( c n ). The error probability is 1 2 erfc(θ). In both cases, Algorithm 1 is an oracle of complexity n = θ 2 r 2 R(w 0 ) that can be used to computew given a,b,z and succeeding with an probability of error smaller than erfc(θ).
Since we have to recover secret bits by Algorithm 1, erfc(θ) should be less than the inverse of the number of secret bits . Using the approximation Φ(−x) ≈ ϕ(x)/x when x is large (so Φ(−x) is small) we obtain
and thereby a reasonable choice for θ. Flip bit i ofz to getz 5:
Call Algorithm 1 on input (ā,b,z , n = θ 2 R(w)) to getw 6:
ifw =w − 1 then 7:ci ←ci ⊕ 1 8:
end if 9: end for Recovering the whole secret key. Algorithm 2 shows how to recover the secret key by building a system of linear equations with the help of Algorithm 1. Clearly the complexity of Algorithm 2 is θ 2 (4R(w) + mR(w)) and we have to call it /m times on independent (ā,b) pairs to fully recover X and Y , where is the length of the secret key (Note that = (k x + k y )m in Random-HB # and = k x + k y + 2m − 2 in HB # ). The expected number of errors in the equation system defining X and Y is · erfc(θ). The probability that a passive attack gives an (ā,b) linearly dependent from the i previous ones is
kx+ky . The number of passive attacks to get the inputs for Algorithm 2 is thus
and can be neglected in comparison to the /m calls of Algorithm 2.
Computational complexity. The computational complexity of the given attack is quite low in comparison to the number of authentications needed: For each call of Algorithm 1 we have at most n incrementation of a counter and one evaluation of P −1 . For Random-HB # , after running Algorithm 2 we have m linear binary equation systems in k x + k y variables (one for each row of the matrix [X |Y ]), which can thus be solved in O(m(k x + k y )
3 ) operations. This number is negligible in comparison to the number of authentications needed to perform Algorithm 2 and is even lower for HB # . Throughout the paper we thus measure the complexity of our attack in terms of (intercepted) authentications between the tag and the reader.
Asymptotic Complexity Analysis
The complexity of the attack is related to the complexity of Algorithm 2 which is in its turn related to the complexity of Algorithm 1. Thus, the main component of the attack affecting the overall complexity is the input n in Algorithm 1.
2 )/(1 − 2η) 2 ) so the complexity of our attack is exponential in u 2 as we can use a θ logarithmic in .
Parameters with optimal complexity. The minimal value of n is reached when u = 0 which happens when the estimated valuew est of wt(ν) is
In this case we obtain
Obviously, our attack has optimal complexity if we can call Algorithm 2 on input of valid triplets (ā,b,z) with wt(ν) =w opt , only. As clearly, for most parameter sets the latter is not true for random triplets obtained by passive attacks, we would like to manipulate errors inz to reach an expected value of w opt . Unfortunately, due to the hardness of the LPN problem, we cannot remove errors fromz ifw >w opt . However, ifw ≤w opt then we can inject errors inz so that the resulting vector has an expected weight ofw opt and the attack remains polynomial. This case happens when:
using the approximationw est ≈ mη when a valid triplet (ā,b,z) is obtained by a passive attack and the false rejection rate of the HB # protocol is negligible. Thus in this case, our attack remains optimal.
Categorization of parameter sets. We have seen, that for u = 0, our attack has subquadratic running time. However, even if u = O( ln )), we obtain a polynomial time attack. Thus, from Formula (2) we distinguish three cases: Depending on the category of the parameter set, there are different strategies to find the triplets (ā,b,z) which serve as input for Algorithm 2 (and thus Algorithm 1). We present those strategies in the following and give numbers for the according parameter sets.
Strategy for the case t ≥ 2mη(1 − η)
Thanks to the hypothesis t ≥ 2mη(1 − η), we have thatw opt ≥w = mη. Thus, the best strategy is to optimize the complexity of Algorithm 1 by having a triplet (ā,b,z) with an error vector of expected Hamming weightw opt . Using a triplet (ā,b,z) obtained from a passive attack, we can flip the last (w opt − mη)/(1 − 2η) bits ofz to getν of expected Hamming weightw opt and then use the attack described previously.
Application to parameter vector II. As these parameters are in the case t ≥ 2mη(1−η), we can use Algorithm 2 in its optimum complexity to attack both Random-HB # and HB # . After computingw opt = 77.167, P (w opt ) = 0.0431, R(w opt ) = 269.39 and the expected value ofw = mη = 55, we have to flip f = 29 bits to get an expected value close tow opt . For Random-HB # the number of bits to retrieve is = (k x + k y )m = 261 072 for which we can use θ = 3.164. The total complexity is θ 2 R(w opt ) = 2 29. 4 . In the case of HB # the number of secret bits is = k x + k y + 2m − 2 = 1 472 for which we use θ = 2.265 and end up with complexity of θ 2 R(w opt ) = 2 21 .
Strategy for t close to 2mη(1 − η)
The case t < 2mη(1 − η) is trickier to address since the expected value ofw becomes greater than w opt . To achieve the same complexity as the previous case we would have to reduce the Hamming weight ofν which is infeasible in polynomial time due to the hardness of the LPN problem. However, if t is a only a little less than 2mη(1 − η) then the expected value ofw is not far from w opt . So, we can use Algorithm 2 without flipping any bit of z and the complexity is still polynomial. To further speed up the attack, we can remove errors fromz in step 9 of Algorithm 2 until we reachw = w opt which we can expect to happen at iteration i = west−wopt west .
Application to parameter set I. For parameter set I we have t < 2mη(1−η). We first computew est = mη = 291,w opt = 228, P (w opt ) = 0.0135, R(w est ) = 15 532 and R(w opt ) = 2742.6. For Random-HB # , the number of key bits is = (k x +k y )m = 689 088 and θ = 3.308 is enough to guarantee that erfc(θ) ≤ 
Strategy for lower t
The case of lower t, the false acceptance rate will be very low but the false rejection rate of HB # becomes high (e.g. 0.5 for t = mη; Please remember that for t < mη, HB # is no longer provable secure in the GRS security model.) so that it would require more than one authentication in average for the tag to authenticate itself. The main advantage of this approach is that the complexity of Algorithm 1 becomes exponential. Here, we present a better strategy than calling Algorithm 2 with an triplet (ā,b,z) obtained by a simple passive attack.
Our goal is to call Algorithm 2 with aw est as low as possible. During the protocol, we can set (â,b,ẑ) to (a, b, z⊕ν) withν of weightw until the reader acceptŝ z. Then, we launch our attack with (ā,b,z) = (a, b, z). A detailed description is shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Getting (a, b, z) with low Hamming weight
Input:w Output: (a, b, z) such that (aX ⊕ bY ⊕ z) has low weight.
Processing:
1: Pick random vectorν of Hamming weightw 2: repeat 3: During a protocol with messages (a, b, z), setẑ = z ⊕ν 4: until reader accepts The probability thatẑ gets accepted by the verifier is P (w) which can be written in an equivalent way to Equation (1) as:
For an acceptedẑ, the m −w positions not in the support ofν are erroneous with probability
On the other hand, the other positions ofẑ in the support ofν are non-zero with probability
Thus, because of the high false rejection rate, ifẑ gets accepted in our MIMAttack with (ā,b,z) = (0, 0,ν), we can expect that the error vector ν, introduced in (a, b, z) the output of Algorithm 3, has weightw est = (m −w)ηw +w(1 − η The following table we consider parameter sets I and II with modified t. It shows the costs to learn one bit about the secret key, i.e. calling Algorithm 1 with a random vector obtained by a passive attack in comparison to calling Algorithm 3 first and then Algorithm 1 with its output. Note, that recovering successive bits is always cheaper. 
Optimizing the Attack
In this Section, we present our best attack on Random-HB # and HB # . First, we optimize Algorithm 2. Using an adaptive solution to the weighing problem [5] we show how to efficiently recover the error vector. Then, we present our full attack.
Optimizing Algorithm 2
The problem we are solving in Algorithm 2 can be formulated as follows: given a m-bit vector ν of Hamming weight w and an oracle measuring the sum of some selected bits (Algorithm 1) , what is the minimal number of measurements to fully recover ν?
The naïve solution to this problem employed in Algorithm 2 takes m measurements. A more sophisticated solution to to fully recover a vector ν of arbitary weight was already given by Erdős and Rényi in [5] . They show that the minimal number of measurements required is upper-bounded by (m log 2 9)/ log 2 m. To recover ν in the given complexity, they define a fixed series of measurements for each m. However, in our case, the vector ν is known to be of small weight (≤ mη), which allows us to improve on the solution by Erdős and Rényi. Our
Algorithm 4 Finding errors in |J|-bit windows
Input:ā,b,z,w = wt(āX ⊕bY ⊕z), a set J ⊆ {0, 1, · · · m} and wJ the number of non-zero (āX ⊕bY ⊕z)j, j ∈ J Output: I ⊆ J containing the j with non-zero (āX ⊕bY ⊕z)j, j ∈ J. Processing:
1: if wJ = 0 then 2: I ← ∅ 3: else if wJ = |J| then 4:
I ← J 5: else 6:
Choose J1 ⊆ J such that |J1| = |J|/2 . 7:
Set ν the m-vector with ν j = 1 iff j ∈ J1 8:
Call Algorithm 1 on input (ā,b,z ⊕ ν , n = 4θ 2 R(w)) to get w . 9:
Call Algorithm 4 with (ā,b,z,w, J1, wJ 1 = (w + |J1| − w )/2) to get I1 10:
Call Algorithm 4 with (ā,b,z,w, J \ J1, wJ − wJ 1 ) to get I2 11:
proposal, Algorithm 4, does not use a fixed series of measurements but takes into account the partial information obtained by all previous measurements.
To determine the error positions in a k-bit window by measuring the weight, Algorithm 4 uses a divide-and-conquer strategy: it splits the vector into two windows of the same length then measures each of them. For those parts which do not have full or zero weight it then applies this strategy recursively leading to a lower number of measurements comparing to measuring a k-bit window bit by bit as Algorithm 2 does.
The number of invocations of Algorithm 1, C w (k), to fully recover a k-bit window with known Hamming weight w by Algorithm 4 is
Let C(k) be the average number of invocations of Algorithm 1 to first determine the number of errors in a k-bit window and then recover their positions using Algorithm 4:
We note that C(k)/k is minimal when k is a power of 2. Although, it is clear from Table 3 that the number of measurements decreases when k increases, the cost of measuring the weight of a k-bit window also increases faster with k, so a good tradeoff is to use k = 8. Now that we have an efficient algorithm to find error positions in fixed size windows, we introduce Algorithm 5 which takes benefit from Algorithm 4 to optimize the number of measurements needed to localize the introduced errors and output m linear equations. Algorithm 5 splits the error vector introduced in a triplet (ā,b,z) to m/k k-bit windows, each one of these is then recovered using Algorithm 4. Additionally, using the learned bits, it adjustsz so that the next measurements cost less. The number of calls to Algorithm 4 we need before we reachw =w opt , is then
So the full complexity of Algorithm 5 is given by
Final Algorithm
The final attack is described in Algorithm 6. The idea is to get a vector with low expected weight using Algorithm 3 and then find all the erroneous positions inserted by the tag to obtain m linear equations and iterate this until we get enough equations to solve and find the secrets X and Y . To get the lower complexity, we can flip the last bits ofz so that we end up with an expected weight ofw opt . We note that introducing errors in a full segment as defined by
Step 4 of Algorithm 5 does not increase the needed number of measurements as C w (k) = C k−w (k). Using Formula (3), we deduce the full complexity in terms of intercepted authentications as
Application to parameter set I. With input k = 8 and w = 300 we obtain P (w) = 2 −7 ,w est = 273 andw opt = 228, i = 24, R(w opt ) = 2742.6, R(w est ) = 7 026.4. So the full complexity of the attack is then given by Equation (7) Choose J ∈ S 7:
Call Algorithm 1 on input (ā,b,z ⊕ J, n = θ 2 R(w)) to getw = wt(ν AND J) 8:
Call Algorithm 4 with (ā,b,z,w, J, wJ = (w + |J| −w )/2) to get I 9:
Setci ←ci ⊕ 1 for all i ∈ I 10:
Remove J from S 12:
ifw >wopt then 13:
Flip min(|I|,w −wopt) bitszi for which i ∈ I 14:w ←w − min(|I|,w −wopt) 15:
else ifw <wopt then 16:
Flip min(|J \ I|,wopt −w) bitszi for which i ∈ J \ I 17:w ←w + min(|J \ I|,wopt −w) 18:
end if 19: until S∅ Application to parameter set II. In this case, we have k = 8, w = 0 and w est = 55. We flip 29 bits to obtain an error vector of expected weightw opt = 77, which yields R(w opt ) = 269.39 and i = 0. The complexity is 2 19.7 sessions for HB # and 2 28.1 for Random-HB # .
Attacking parameter vectors without false rejections
To thwart the previous attacks without taking parameter sets with huge m or high false rejection rate, we could change the protocol so that the prover generates a vector ν of constant or bounded Hamming weight like it was proposed for parameter set III. In this section we will show that this leads to different attacks. Assume that the prover accepts (a, b, z) iff w = wt(aX ⊕ bY ⊕ z) = t, then from this triplet the attacker learns
It is possible to recover the matrices X and Y by sending z ⊕ν instead of the Tag's response z to the Reader, whereν is a m-bit vector of Hamming weight . The above approach may be generalized to the case where the Hamming weight of ν is bounded in the original protocol, i.e. if the verifier accepts if w ≤ t and the prover discards error vectors which are going to be rejected. This was suggested for the parameter vector III. Again, the attacker can replace the Tag's answer z by z ⊕ν whereν is of weight 2. Now, the attackers response z ⊕ν gets rejected iff w ∈ {t − 1, t} and the attacker flipped two non-erroneous positions. Thus, in the case of a rejection, the attacker learns
which happens with probability
Application to parameter set III. For the parameter vector III, the attacker learns two bits about the secret key every 1/q = 2 9.02 ≈ 512 iterations. This is 16 times faster than an attack by Algorithm 1 and needs only · 2/q = 2 26 authentications to recover a Random-HB # secret key (2 19 for HB # ).
In this section, we investigate the lower bounds on the parameter sets for which our attack is not effective. We say that HB # is secure if recovering one bit of information about the secret key requires an attack with complexity (in terms of protocol sessions) within an order of magnitude of at least 2 s and time complexity "reasonably comparable".
Let us assume that Algorithm 3 succeeds with a total error weight of t = wt(ν ⊕ν) when the added error vector has weightw. To obtain this vector, the attacker limited to 2 80 operations can choose the inputw in any way, such that 1/P (w) = 1/Φ(
we can be sure, that thew chosen by the attacker satisfies that We can now calculate the valuew est by using equations (4), (5) and (6) and then by using Formula (2) with r = 1/2 and θ = 1/2 (which leads to erfc(θ) = 0.4795) we can estimate the total cost of the attack. By using an exhaustive search on m we obtain that m = 1 697 for η = 1/4 and m = 2 903 for η = 1/8 is the lowest choice achieving 2 80 -security and 50% of false rejection rate. The full results with the intermediates values are summarized in Table 4 . Table 4 . Lowest values of m and t = mη for which our attack is not effective. Following this method we obtain the graphs of Fig. 2 showing how the security scales with growing m. To reach this security with a more acceptable false rejection rate (ideally negligible), it requires m to be higher.
Conclusion
In this article, we proved that the conjecture about the security of Random-HB # and HB # is wrong. We presented a basic attack against these protocols that allows to retrieve the shared secret between a reader and a tag. We showed a lower bound on the parameter set for which our attack is not effective but such parameters are unpractical to use in RFID tags.
Although it may not be the most effective for all versions, our attack is valid against all anterior protocols of the HB family. There are still new versions in the HB family. PUF-HB, proposed by Hammouri and Sunar [10] uses a physical unclonable function but does not carry any proof of security against man-in-the-middle attacks within. Indeed, a closer look reveals several possible points of attack for a man in the middle like flipping the last bit in the challenge vector a. On the other side, Trusted-HB, proposed by Bringer and Chabanne [2] , is proved secure against general man-in-the-middle attacks. However, this comes at the cost of adding a check on the integrity of the error vector using a secure cryptographic hash function which on its own would be sufficient to allow authentication by shared secrets.
